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DUTY OF OUTRAGE: THE DEFENSE LAWYER'S
OBLIGATION TO SPEAK TRUTH TO POWER TO
THE PROSECUTOR AND THE COURT WHEN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS UNJUST
Ellen C. Yaroshefsky*
For decades, scholars, lawyers, and judges have spotlighted what is
now recognized as a permanent state of crisis in the system of public
defense in the United States.' More than fifty years after the watershed
decision in Gideon v. Wainwright declared the states must provide
counsel to indigents accused of felonies,2 it is acknowledged that
criminal defense systems fail to live up to the promise. The reality is
grim. Funding is sorely lacking to provide even minimally adequate
defense in most offices around the country.' As celebrated Southern
Poverty Law Center director Stephen Bright has observed, "[n]o
constitutional right is celebrated so much in the abstract and observed so
little in reality as the right to counsel." 4
Defense lawyers, judges, scholars, bar leaders, and other thought
leaders wring their hands about the state of Gideon fifty years after its

* Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the Jacob Burns Center for Ethics in the
Practice of Law at Cardozo Law School. The author thanks Bruce Green and Susan Fortney for
organizing this symposium in honor of Monroe Freedman, a remarkable scholar and friend who
made a difference in large and small ways in the lives of so many. I dedicate this "duty of outrage"
Article to him and can only imagine his infectious humor as he might have commented upon this
piece.
1. The lack of adequate defense services is longstanding and systemic. It is properly termed
a "permanent state of crisis." Anthony C. Thompson, The Promise of Gideon: Providing HighQuality Public Defense in America, 31 QUtNNIPIAC L. REv. 713, 718-23 (2013). For years, it was
called a crisis but that term is a misnomer. Crisis connotes a temporary critical situation: "[a] time
of intense difficulty, trouble, or danger" or "[a] time when a difficult or important decision must be
made." Crisis, OXFORD DICTIONARY, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_
english/crisis (last visited July 24, 2016).
2. 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963).
3. Thompson, supranote 1, at 724.
4. Stephen Bright, Turning CelebratedPrinciples into Reality, S.CTR.FOR HUM. RTS. (Jan.
15, 2003), https://www.schr.org/node/95.
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initial promise.' Articles abound discussing this state of perpetual crisis,6
including the necessity for legislatures and the courts to take action to
assure at least minimal funding.
Scholars explore the effect of this perpetually difficult situation on
clients and certainly on defense counsel.8 Despite this state of affairs,
public defenders, often heroic and seriously overworked, spend
countless hours attempting to provide diligent and competent defense to
their clients.9 They are zealous advocates who seek to maximize the
client's dignity and autonomy. Nevertheless, the perceived necessity to
trade off work on one client's case to achieve some measure of justice
for clients accused of more serious crimes is a theme; they engage in
triage. On virtually a daily basis, defense lawyers have very little time
and bargain their ability to be competent and diligent for one client
against another.1" Monroe Freedman argued persuasively that triagethe perceived necessity of defense lawyers trading off work on one
client's case for another-is unethical. 1 His article stirred a debate,
precisely because defense lawyers believe that they have no choice in an
underfunded system. 2 Some lawyers and law offices get to the point of
refusing to take new cases-properly citing their inability to provide

5. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 344; see also ABA Comm'n on Prof. Ethics & Prof l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441 (2006); Peter A. Joy, Ensuring the Ethical Representation of
Clients in the Face of Excessive Caseloads, 75 MO. L. REV. 771, 777-78 (2010); Peter A. Joy,
RationingJustice by Rationing Lawyers, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 205, 212-13 (2011); Charles J.
Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defenderfor the 21st Century, 58 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 81, 89 (1995).
6. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Freidman, Rethinking Indigent Defense:
PromotingEffective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choicefor All
Criminal Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 74-75 (1993) (arguing that most criminal defense
systems in the United States are in a state of perpetual crisis).
7. Thompson, supranote 1, at 768.
8. Barbara A. Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 180-81 (1984);
Abbe Smith, Too Much Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life and FracturedEgo of the
Empathic,Heroic Public Defender, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1203, 1256-64 (2004); Michael E. Tigar,
Defending, 74 TEX. L. REV. 101, 103 (1995).

9. Joe Patrice, Slate Suggests Public Defenders Are Incompetent; Public Defenders
Disagree, ABOVE LAW (July 29, 2013), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/07/slate-suggests-publicdefenders-are-incompetent-public-defenders-disagree (defending the claim that public defenders are
incompetent by emotional attachment and passion to pursue each of their client's goals).
10. AM. BAR ASS'N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON'S
BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 19-20 (2004), http://www.

americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal aid-indigent defendants/Is sclaid def bp-ri
ght-to counsel in criminal~proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf.
11. Monroe Freedman, An Ethical Manifesto for Public Defenders, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 911,
914, 918-21 (2005).
12. See Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from
InstitutionalDesign, 104 CoLUM. L. REV. 801, 805-06, 820-21, 828 (2004).
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effective assistance of counsel. 3 They have risked contempt of court for
such compliance with ethical obligations.' 4
Other academics write and discuss how one can maintain a public
defense practice under these conditions on a long term basis. Can one be
a career public defender? 5 Can lawyers maintain their sense of
upholding the dignity and autonomy
of each individual client after years
16
down?
them
wearing
system
of the
Particularly in the last five to seven years, popular discourse about
the failings of the criminal justice system has expanded beyond Gideon's
empty promise-far beyond the crisis in funding of public defenders.
Books,17 articles, 8 blogs,19 TV talk shows,2" Netflix series, 2' and reform
organizations 22 promote the view that our criminal justice system is
13. Recently, in New Orleans, this argument came to a head. The New Orleans Public
Defenders office announced that it would begin to refuse some felony cases because its workload
compromised attorneys' ability to properly represent their clients. See Richard Fausset, Suit
Describes 'Waiting List' for Legal Aid in New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES (Jan 15. 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/16/us/new-orleans-public-defender-lawsuit.html. The ACLU then
filed a class-action suit in Louisiana district court alleging that due to its "dysfunctional funding
scheme" the Louisiana public defense system is unconstitutionally underfunded. See Class Action
Complaint at 2, 10, 12, Yarls v. Burton, No. 3:16-CV-31 (M.D. La. Jan. 14, 2016).
14. See Martha Neil, Judge Has Public Defender Handcuffed, but Gives Him a Break at
Contempt Hearing, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 25, 2015, 6:45 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
judge haspublic defender-handcuffedbut gives him a break at contempt hear. In a recent and
particularly shocking example, a judge and public defender engaged in a fistfight after the
defense lawyer refused to waive his client's right to a speedy trial. After the incident, the judge
was suspended but returned to the bench afterward. The defense lawyer resigned in protest.
See Jacob Gershman, Public Defender Quits After Judge in Courtroom Fight Returns to
Bench, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (July 8, 2014, 1:41 PM), http://blogs.wsj.comflaw/2014/07/08/
public-defender-quits-after-judge-in-courtroom-fight-returns-to-bench. Brian Jones was held in
contempt in Ohio for refusing to go forward on a case where he could not provide effective
assistance of counsel. State v. Jones, No. 2008-P-0018, 2008 WL 5428009, at *1-2 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2008); Milan Simonich, Contempt Upheldfor Ohio Public Defender, PITT. POST-GAZETTE
(Aug. 25, 2007, 6:45 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/frontpage/2007/08/24/Contempt-upheldfor-Ohio-public-defender/stories/200708240267.
15. Abbe Smith & William Montross, The Calling of Criminal Defense, 50 MERCER L. REV.
443, 532-34 (1999).
16. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications:Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public
Defenders, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1239, 1267-71, 1273 (1993).
17. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 48, 50 (rev. ed. 2012).
18. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, MIAMI U. L. REV. 425, 428-32
(1997).
19. See, e.g., MARSHALL PROJECT, https://www.themarshallproject.org (last visited July 24,
2016).
20. See, e.g., Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Bail, YouTuBE (HBO June 7, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-IS5mwymTIJU.
21. See, e.g., Making a Murderer(Netflix 2015).
22. See Criminal Law Reform, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/criminal-law-reform
(last visited July 24, 2016); Criminal Justice Program Issues, NAACP, http://www.naacp.
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broken, unfair, and disproportionately targets and punishes poor people
of color-primarily young black and brown men, and increasingly black
and brown women.23 The conversation includes the lack of meaningful
public defense systems, but has expanded to a view of the system as
unjust-with highly publicized wrongful convictions2 4-sometimes
caused by intentional acts of prosecutorial and police misconduct.
Beyond wrongful convictions, public attention is directed to unfair bail
conditions,25 disproportionate sentencing,2 6 and overcharging by
prosecutors to obtain a plea.2 7 In other words, a focus on the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion that may include, but often falls short of, a
28
constitutional violation.
This is not news to public defenders. They have complained and
groused about these issues for years. A constant refrain from defense
lawyers leaving a courtroom is "that was outrageous," 29 illustrating
yet another instance of a client whose interaction with the criminal
justice system is a far, far cry from what the proverbial "reasonable
person" might call "justice."3 Improvident bail decisions that will
keep an indigent person in jail for a lengthy time often forcing them to
plead guilty to be released,3 1 excessive charging decisions,32 plea
org/pages/criminal-justice-issues (last visited July 24, 2016); NAT'L ASS'N CRIM. DEF. LAW.,
http://www.nacdl.org (last visited July 24, 2016); RIGHT ON CRIE, http://rightoncrime.com (last
visited July 24, 2016).
23. See ALEXANDER, supra note 17, at 48, 50; Davis, supra note 18, at 428-32; see also Rich
Juzwiak & Aleksander Chan, Unarmed People of Color Killed by Police, 1999-2014, GAWKER
(Dec. 18, 2014, 2:15 PM), http://gawker.com/unarmed-people-of-color-killed-by-police-1999-20141666672349.
24. See DNA Exonerations Nationwide, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Mar. 9, 2016, 11:46 AM),
http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent/improve-the-law/fact-sheets/dna-exonerationsnationwide.
25. See Matthew J. Hegreness, America's Fundamentaland Vanishing Right to Bail, 55 ARIz.
L. REv. 909, 956-57 (2013); see also Bail Fail: Why the US. Should End the Practiceof Using
Moneyfor Bail, JUST. POL'Y INST. (Sept. 2012), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/
documents/bailfail-executive -summary.pdf.
26. See, e.g., Rachel Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 753-54 (2005);
William T. Pizzi et al., Discrimination in Sentencing on the Basis ofAfrocentric Features, 10 MICH.
J. RACE & L. 327, 341-45 (2005); Cassia Spohn, The Effects of the Offender's Race, Ethnicity, and
Sex on FederalSentencing Outcomes in the Guidelines Era, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 10304 (2013); Joe Palazzolo, Racial Gap in Men's Sentencing, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2013, at A3.
27. Kyle Graham, Overcharging, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 701, 701-05 (2014).
28. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, American Prosecutor:Power, Discretion,and Misconduct, 23
A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUST. 24, 24-25; William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of CriminalLaw,
100 MICH. L. REv. 505, 509 (2001) (noting the shifting of power to prosecutors by a broad range of
activities that are criminalized).
29. Thompson, supranote 1, at 718-23.
30. Id.
31. Laura I. Appelman, Justice in the Shadowlands: PretrialDetention, Punishment and the
Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1297, 1305 (2012).
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bargaining that is not a "bargain" in any true sense of the term and is the
result of inordinate pressure upon the defendant, 3 harsh sentences,3 4
the constant plea mill in misdemeanor court,'3 5 and destructive collateral
consequences of a conviction are all omnipresent. 36 The criminal justice
system results in the now-acknowledged mass incarceration of indigent
black and brown people.37
How the criminal justice system works and does not work on
a daily basis is of longstanding academic and practitioner concern.3 8
Twenty years ago, Professor Abbe Smith recounted the student
experience in her criminal defense clinic.39 The students, in their case,
were "stunned to encounter [a] criminal defense nightmare" 4 -a young
client who came to court with his parents on a minor case ended up in
handcuffs and carted off to jail. Professor Smith "courted contempt" for
presumably disagreeing with a judge "who asserted her authority for no
apparent reason except to flex her robes.'
This is typical of the accumulated daily minor and major perceived
injustices that have worn down many defenders for years. Defense work
may be perceived as glamorous by some-fighting the good fight
against the "system" against wrongful convictions-but it is frustrating;
it "has as much frustration as glory."4 2 The frustration often expressed
is that the prosecutor's position or argument or the court's decision
was outrageous. 43
This longstanding sense of unfairness and "outrage" is not
necessarily of a cognizable legal wrong; it is typically not the subject of

32. See Graham,supra note 27, at 704.
33. Stephen Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1981 (1992);
Jackelyn Katte, Guilty as Pleaded: How Appellate Waivers in Plea Bargaining Implicate
ProsecutorialEthic Concerns, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 643, 647, 657 (2015).
34. See Anjelica Cappellino & John Meringolo, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the
Pursuitof FairandJust Sentences, 77 ALB. L. REV. 771, 812 (2014).
35. See Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089,
1097, 1111-12 (2013).
36.

CECELIA KLINGELE ET AL., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS:

LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 2-7 (2013); David S. Kirk & Robert J. Sampson, Juvenile Arrest and
CollateralEducationalDamage in the Transition to Adulthood, 86 Soc. EDUC. 36, 38 (2013).
37. ALEXANDER, supranote 17, at 17.
38. See Alan J. Gocha, A Call for Realism in the Justice System: Why Criminal Defense
Attorneys Should Take Race into Account When Advising Clients, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 547,

550 (2015).
39. See Abbe Smith, Carryingon in Criminal Court: When Criminal Defense Is Not So Sexy
and Other Grievances, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 723, 727 (1995).
40. Id. at 732.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 727 n.23.
43. See, e.g., id at 744.
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appellate decisions." While there may be instances of actionable
prosecutorial misconduct, most of the complaints of outrage are the daily
fodder in misdemeanor courts or in the daily decisions in felony cases
that ultimately result in guilty pleas. a5 Defenders may argue vehemently
inside or outside of court as to why a particular prosecutorial or judicial
action is unfair, unnecessary, and unjust, but these arguments are often
rejected. 46 The defender is left to express frustration, exasperation, and
mistreatment of the client to office mates and to vent with peers and
friends. Systemic unfairness toward indigent defendants is an accepted
proposition in most defense circles.47 Obviously, this view is not widely
shared by prosecutors and the bench.
A current example of an "outrage," which sparked this Articleand can illustrate the proposed obligations of the prosecutor, defense
lawyers, and judge-is a midnight arraignment in a New York City
courtroom of a sixty-two-year-old man-call him Cy Lester-with no
criminal history, not even a prior arrest. He was brought to the court by a
police officer who had stopped his car while he was en route to take his
wife to a doctor appointment. The officer arrested him while his elderly,
nearly blind, diabetic wife in the passenger seat begged the officer not to
because she needed his assistance. His offense? Assault: two weeks
before he punched his wife in the head. A neighbor called the police, but
there had been no arrest. The wife subsequently signed a statement. The
man recently had hernia surgery and complications from an infection.
Consequently, he stood before the court with a stomach pump and tubes
protruding from his body. The pretrial Criminal Justice Agency
recommended that he be released on his own recognizance. Scott, the
defense lawyer,4 8 of course concurred, especially given his client's
precarious physical condition. Scott contacted the wife by phone. She
could not come to court but begged for the assistance of her husband and
said, "I never wanted to sign that statement, but that they told me it was
the only way he would not go to jail."
The prosecution requested $2000 bail. Scott argued vigorously that
the indigent defendant should be released: he was recommended for
release, he was not a risk of flight or of any danger to his wife, she
wanted and needed him to be home, and he had no funds; Rikers Island

44. See, e.g., id. 741-44.
45. See, e.g., id. at 744 nn.98-99.
46. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death:
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in CapitalCases, 75 B.U. L. REv. 759,
797 (1995).
47. Id. at 800-03.
48. This is an assumed name for the attomey.
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would be inevitable and it would be dangerous for him because he would
not get necessary medical care; and, so on. The argument fell on deaf
ears. The court set bail at $2000 and the defendant was taken to Rikers
Island. The police officer who had arrested the defendant expressed
shock, as did others in the courtroom. It was, by all accounts, an
unreasonable and dangerous decision.49 The defense lawyers in the
court, of course, proclaimed "this is outrageous."
In court, Scott was zealous and professional. He performed
admirably. He gave the client a voice-putting himself between the
client and the power of the state. 50 He acted, in criminal defense
parlance, as "liberty's last champion. ' '51 He lost. He immediately sprang
into action and appealed the bail decision. The time it took to attend
to this case took him away from other clients. After hours of work,
he won on appeal, perhaps saving Cy Lester from an untimely
death from medical inaction. In our classic parlance about the lawyer's
52
role-providing diligent, competent counsel and zealous advocacy,
he was effective. He ultimately appealed an unreasonable decision and
was successful.
Scott's conduct is the embodiment of our accepted view of
advocacy: reliance upon the system's processes and procedures to
promote justice. Our due process model of competent counsel is
that lawyers engage in motion practice to challenge searches,
seizures, confessions, prosecutorial and police misconduct, and a wide
range of constitutional and statutory violations.5 3 But, for Cy Lester, it
was dangerous, and for Scott, his office, and the court, it was at the

49. The man became ill when unattended at Rikers Island and was taken to the hospital where
he also did not receive medical care because they did not have the proper nozzles to fit his pump.
The lawyer, in constant contact with the wife, secured her attendance the next day and filed a writ to
have the man released. The supreme court (trial court) ordered his release. It took another eight
hours after the signed order to secure his release.
50. Smith, supra note 39, at 732.
51. See, e.g., Gerald Lippert, Affiliate News, NAT'L ASS'N CRIM. DEF. LAW. (2006),
http://wwwnacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id-923.
52. The ABA Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct requires "diligence" and "competen[ce]."
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013). Zealous advocacy, contained in
the old Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, is not in the new Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. Nevertheless, the criminal defense system understands the role of the defense lawyer as
providing "zealous advocacy." Lincoln Caplan, The Good Advocate, LEGAL AFF. (June 2004),
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/May-June-2004/editorial-mayjun04.msp.
53. ABA Comm'n on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441 (2006) (discussing
the obligation of lawyers who represent indigent criminal defendants when excessive caseloads
interfere with competent and diligent representation); Smith, supra note 39, at 742; DNA
Exonerations Nationwide, supra note 24, at 1-3. DNA exonerations show there has been
constitutional and statutory violations, prosecutorial and police misconduct, and likely challenges of
searches, seizures, and confessions, because otherwise the individuals would still be incarcerated.
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very least a poor use of public resources and money. At worst,
the system's procedures may not be successful and the injustice
will continue.
What can and should be changed to remedy the significant
problems that cause lawyers to leave a courtroom in suppressed fits and
spasms of anger stating "that was outrageous"? Certainly, the
fundamental responsibility for causing such events (where the defense
lawyer's sense of outrage would be shared by the proverbial reasonable
person) rests with the prosecution and the court.54 Reform organizations
and individuals continue in their attempts to change and advance the
administration of federal and state criminal laws such as criminal
statutes, bail provisions, discovery laws, sentencing schemes, and postconviction remedies. 5 This Article acknowledges that this fundamental
responsibility does not rest with the defense bar5 6 but nevertheless
suggests the defense lawyer's ethical obligation be amplified, when
appropriate, to place the burden where it belongs: on the prosecution for
acting outside of its minister of justice role and the court for failing to
ensure the integrity of the system.57 Some consistent examples are as
follows: (1) bail requested by a prosecutor and set by a judge when the
proverbial reasonable person would not set bail; (2) young or infirm
people sent to jail when the jail conditions have been deemed
unconstitutional; and (3) when the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
will result in yet another young man who grew up in poverty about to be
"put through the system" for a relatively minor offense when studies
demonstrate clearly that such a path will likely render him unable to
complete school, get a job, vote, or lead a productive life. 8 These are not

54. Former Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman advocated legislative change for bail statutes to
ensure that defendants in misdemeanor cases presumptively be released and that the bail system
is not a "parody of justice." Judge Lippman created bail review courts in all New York
City boroughs where defense counsel can appeal bail decisions, such as the one in this case. Andrew
Denny, Lippman Announces Initiatives to Reform 'Broken' Bail System, N.Y.L.J. (Oct. 2,
2015), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202738656935/Lippman-Announces-Initiatives-toReform-Broken-Bail-System?slretum=20160024094839.
55. See, e.g., Criminal Justice and Law Enforcement, CATO INST., http://www.cato.org/
research/criminal-justice-law-enforcement (last visited July 24, 2016); NAT'L ASS'N CRIM. DEF.
LAW., supra note 22; RIGHT ON CRIME, http://rightoncrime.com (last visited July 24, 2016)
(explaining the group to be the conservative organization advocating criminal justice reform). Some
will argue that this demonstrates that the burden for effective case management is upon the courts,
not the prosecutors or defense lawyers. This argument, however, ignores multiple roles and
responsibilities to individuals, clients, and the criminal justice system.
56. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 91-93.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 88-93, 96-1001.
58. See Kirk & Sampson, supranote 36, at 47 (providing empirical evidence that an arrest of
a high school student has "severe consequences for the prospects of educational attainment").
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prosecutorial or judicial discretionary decisions readily subject to motion
practice and appeal.5 9
This Article asks whether this sense of "outrage" should obligate
the defense lawyer to take additional action in court. If so, what would
that be? I argue below that, notably in light of the current discourse
about a flawed or perhaps broken criminal justice system, the increased
attention to the role of the prosecution as a minister of justice and to the
judge, who is ethically obligated to ensure the integrity of the justice
system, the defense lawyer should speak "truth to power."60 In other
words, the defense lawyer should call upon the prosecutor who has acted
contrary to a robust understanding of her role as a "minister of justice"
to reconsider-to change her position in light of the evidence-based data
about the criminal justice system as well as the more enlightened and
evolving view of the minister of justice role.61 Similarly, the defense
lawyer should call upon the court to reconsider and act in accordance
with Rule 1.2 of the ABA Model
Code of JudicialConduct to uphold the
62
"integrity of the judiciary."
59. Michael Cassidy, (Ad)ministering Justice: A Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to Support
Sentencing Reform, 45 LOY. U. CHI.L.J. 981, 1002 (2014).
60. See, e.g., Albert W. Alshuler, Lawyers and Truth-Telling, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
189, 193 (2003) ("At the heart of the lawyer's role is her obligation to speak the truth to
power on behalf of clients."). It is commonly acknowledged that the first notable use of the
phrase was actually in a 1955 Quaker pamphlet. Speak Truth to Power, QUAKER,
http://www.quaker.org/sttp.html (last visited July 24, 2016); Blue Intrigue, The Truth About
Speaking Truth to Power, DAILY Kos (May 15, 2009, 3:24 PM), http://www.dailykos.
com/story/2009/5/15/731888/-; John Green, The Origin of the Phrase "Speaking Truth to
Power," SYNONYM, http://classroom.synonym.com/origin-phrase-speaking-truth-power- 11676.html
(last visited July 24, 2016) ("Although the origin of the phrase is commonly ascribed to a 1955 book
advocating against the Cold War, its [sic] appears to have been coined earlier by civil rights leader
Bayard Rustin."). It contemplates peaceful means to achieve a result and to reinforce the values and
expectations of those in power to achieve laudable goals. The Truth About Speaking Truth to Power,
supra.
61. The commentary to Rule 3.8 of the ABA Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct provides:
A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an
advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant
is accorded procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence,
and that special precautions are taken to prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent
persons.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2013). Scholars have debated the
scope of the minister of justice role that is more expansive than the current ethical obligation. See
Kenneth Bresler, Pretty Phrases: The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice and Administrator of
Justice, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1301, 1301-05 (1996); Bennett L. Gershman, The Zealous
Prosecutoras Minister of Justice, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 151, 151-55 (2011); Bruce A. Green, Why
Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 618-23 (1998); Daniel S.
Medwed, The Prosecutor as a Minister of Justice: Preaching to the Unconvertedfrom the PostConviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35, 39-47 (2009); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of
ProsecutorialTrial Practice: Can ProsecutorsDo Justice?,44 VAND. L. REv. 45, 60-65 (1991).
62. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2010); see id.
Canon 1 ("A
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However, both the minister of the justice role and the court's
obligation to uphold the integrity of the system are bereft of clear
definition, standards, or guidelines. The minister of justice mantra has
long been said to lack specificity, enforceability, and meaning
throughout its history; its meaning and contours have been ill-defined
and criticized as hopelessly vague and unhelpful.63 Nevertheless,
scholars have attempted to provide meaning to aspects of prosecutorial
discretionary decision-making. More than fifteen years ago, Bruce
Green, tracing the history of the minister of justice concept, argued that
the expansive view of the role derives from the fact that the prosecutor is
a fiduciary who represents the sovereign and must make decisions for
the society at large-not any individual client.6 4 Consequently, the
prosecutor must represent the public interest, not simply pursue a guilty
verdict conviction.6 5 Fred Zacharias concluded that prosecutors have
differing obligations depending upon whether the context is litigation or
the prosecutor's broader governing role in the criminal justice system.66
Within the case management (litigation) role, Zacharias argued that a
prosecutor's role is to ensure adversarial fairness so that the result is
worthy of respect.67 Other scholars advocate that the adversarial role
requires neutrality in discretionary decisions-making, empathy and
honesty, and perspective to ensure a commitment that innocent persons
are not wrongfully convicted.68
As to the broader role, beyond individual cases, prosecutors are
acknowledged to have a responsibility "in promoting a fair, reliable and

judge shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary ....),
Comment 3 to Rule 1.2 stipulates, "[c]onduct that compromises or appears to compromise the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of a judge undermines public confidence in the judiciary,"
and Comment 4 states, "[j]udges should.., promote access to justice for all." MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmts. 3-4; see also ABA Comm'n on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 470 (2015); ABA Comm'n on Prof'1 Ethics, Informal Op. 641 (1963); Annette J.
Sceiszinski, A Matter of Trust: A Judge's FiduciaryResponsibility, 49 JUDGES' J. 19, 19-20 (2010).
There is scant literature exploring the full meaning of ensuring integrity of the judiciary.
63. Bennett Gershman described it as "maddeningly vague and frustratingly amorphous."
Gershman, supranote 61, at 155.
64. Green, supra note 61, at 634.
65. Id. at612-13.
66. Zacharias, supranote 61, at 72.
67. Id. at 55-56.
68. Michael Cassidy, Characterand Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a
Prosecutor'sEthical Duty to Seek Justice, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 635, 653 (2006); Bruce A.
Green & Fred C. Zacharias, ProsecutorialNeutrality, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 837, 869; Medwed, supra
note 61, at 45-47. Fred Zacharias and Bruce Green explored what is meant by neutrality and
observed that not only do commentators need to be more precise about what is expected of
prosecutors but that prosecutors' offices need to "undertake the task of identifying workable norms
for the... decisions that their offices make each day." Green & Zacharias, supra,at 840.
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efficient criminal justice system worthy of respect."69 Most recently,
Michael Cassidy cogently argued that the prosecutor's broader role as
administrator of justice in the governing capacity-beyond its role in
individual cases-imposes an ethical obligation to "pursu[e] the public
interest by promoting a just system as a government official."7 Cassidy
argued that prosecutors have an ethical duty to support sentencing
reform. He specified guidelines for state prosecutors "to ensure a
consistent and even-handed application of mandatory minimum
penalties so that line prosecutors do not abuse their substantial
discretion."7 Similarly, Angela Davis argued the prosecution has a duty
to stop mass incarceration.72 This obligation as an administrator of
justice should "at minimum, be concerned about prompting consistency
in the application of the criminal laws, fairness in plea bargaining,
protection of public safety through a reduction of recidivism, and an
efficient expenditure of limited criminal justice resources."73
This robust approach to the minister of justice role as a governing
administrator of justice is premised in large measure upon an evidencebased and socially conscious analysis of the consequences of
prosecutorial action in the criminal justice system. In essence, it is the
composite of daily decision-making in individual cases. I argue that this
framework of knowledge should inform the prosecutor's role in case
management, not only in governance. In other words, there should be a
more holistic view of the role of prosecutors and-by implication-all
of the actors in the system. The holistic model requires the prosecutor
and the court to consider the consequences of their discretionary
decision-making. The minister of justice role should include a robust
sense of proportionality and decency, as well as an understanding of
consequences of discretionary action.74

In great measure, this is because the discourse about the criminal
justice system has reached a critical point where the obligations of all
actors in our system-defense lawyer, prosecution, and judge-cannot

69. Cassidy, supra note 59, at 995; see Bresler, supra note 61, at 1301-05; Gershman, supra
note 61, at 152; Zacharias, supranote 61, at 56.
70. Cassidy, supranote 59, at 994.
71. Id.at 984.
72. See Davis, supra note 28, at 27.
73. Cassidy, supranote 59, at 996.
74. See, e.g., IC Babe Howell, ProsecutorialDiscretion and the Duty to Seek Justice in an
OverburdenedCriminalJustice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 285, 307-08, 321 (2014) ("[B]oth
the duty to do justice and the duty to promote reform are foundational duties of the prosecutor's
office and are consistent with the exercise of discretion to exclude broad categories of cases where
justice and reform can be promoted more effectively by declining to prosecute cases than by
prosecuting cases.").
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be cabined solely into discreet aspects of their respective roles.
Evidence-based real world consequences of discretionary decisions
matter in individual cases. No longer should the prosecutor in the case
management role ("adversarial role") be confined to fairness in the
factual contest. 75 In other words, the acknowledged role that equates
ensuring public confidence in the judicial system with fairness in
prosecuting and convicting criminals while assuring that no innocent
person is wrongly convicted is too narrow. 76 It does not account for the
need of the prosecutor to consider a range of factors that directly affect
individuals charged with crimes. The evidence underlying the
prosecutor's role to advance society broadly through policy work such as
addressing mass incarceration and promoting sentencing reform is the
same evidence that affects--or should affect-daily decision-making in
case management.77 The prosecutor, as a minister of justice, needs to
evaluate a case based upon the broader view of her role as a minister of
justice, and the defense lawyer should call upon the prosecution to act in
accordance with this role and call upon the court to ensure that the
prosecution assumes responsibility for considering the consequences of
the decisions. Certainly, this should be required when a reasonable
perception is that the consequences are unjust.78 In other words, we need
to incorporate our current understanding of the system's flaws, mass
incarceration, and many other ills in examining the necessary and
effective role of counsel.
This includes the evidence-based research about all aspects
of the criminal process-charging, bail decisions, plea bargaining,
discovery, jury selection, and other trial-based issues, as well as
sentencing, causes of wrongful convictions, implicit bias,79
consequences of incarceration, and other collateral consequences.8" That
information is certainly within the wheelhouse of prosecutors' offices
75.

See Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor:A Conceptual Framework, 15

AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 215-17 (1988) (discussing the prosecutor's "quasi-judicial role" to act
"impartially" and "judge-like" by adopting a stance of neutrality in the factual contest).
76. Id. at216-17.
77. See, e.g., Howell, supra note 74, at 303-05.
78. Needless to say, the "reasonable perception" is subject to wide ranging interpretation and
influenced by cognitive biases. Over the course of time, standards and guidelines can be developed
to provide context.
79. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1139-52
(2012) (discussing the presence of implicit bias throughout the charge and plea bargain, trial, and
sentencing phases of a criminal prosecution); see also Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The
Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
795, 805-22 (2012) (discussing the impact of implicit bias on charging decisions, pretrial strategy,
and trial strategy).
80. See supratext accompanying notes 17-43.
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and prosecutorial organizations that consistently sponsor wide-ranging

programs about such issues.8 Recently, some prosecutors have used
"holistic prosecution" 82 or referred to prosecutors as "social justice

advocates" in regard to a renewed role to examine the consequences of
83
prosecutorial decision-making.
This holistic approach to the minister of justice role in case
management is reflected in the 2015 revisions to the ABA Standardsfor
CriminalJustice: ProsecutionandDefense Function:
(e) The prosecutor should be knowledgeable about, consider, and
where appropriate develop or assist in developing alternatives to
prosecution or conviction that may be applicable in individual
cases or classes of cases. The prosecutor's office should be
available to assist community efforts addressing problems that
lead to, or result from, criminal activity or perceived flaws in the
criminal justice system.
(f) The prosecutor is not merely a case-processor but also a problemsolver responsible for considering broad goals of the criminal
justice system. The prosecutor should seek to reform and improve
the administration of criminal justice, and when inadequacies or
injustices in the substantive or procedural law come to the
prosecutor's attention, the prosecutor should stimulate and support
efforts for remedial action. The prosecutor should provide service
to the community, including involvement in public service and bar
activities, public education, community service activities, and Bar
81. See, e.g., Innovative Practices,ASS'N PROSECUTING ATrORNEYS, http://www.apainc.org/
innovative-practices (last visited July 24, 2016) (describing how the Association of Prosecuting
Attorneys, with an eye on improving public safety, has partnered with several other organizations to
provide prosecutors with guidance and assistance on the new and innovative criminal justice
practices available); National Center for Community Prosecution, NAT'L DIST. ATTTORNEYS'
ASS'N, http://www.ndaa.org/nccphome.html (last visited July 24, 2016) (describing the National
Center for Community Prosecution as involving "a long-term, proactive partnership among the
prosecutor's office, law enforcement, the community and public and private organizations, whereby
the authority of the prosecutor's office is used to solve problems, improve public safety and enhance
the quality of life of community members").
82. The Bronx Defenders coined the term "holistic defense." Holistic Defense, Defined,
BRONX DEFENDERS, http://www.bronxdefenders.org/holistic-defense (last visited July 24, 2016). It
refers to providing an individual charged with a crime with a wide range of support services, both
legal and social. Id. According to the Bronx Defenders, "[t]o be truly effective advocates for clients,
attorneys must expand the scope of their representation to address both the collateral consequences
and enmeshed penalties of court involvement, as well as the underlying issues that play a part in
driving clients into the justice systems in the first place." Id.
83. See, e.g., Jennifer Polish, The Role of Prosecutors as Social Justice Advocates, LAw
STREET (June 16, 2015), http://lawstreetmedia.com/issues/law-and-politics/role-of-prosecutors-associal-justice-advocates (discussing the opportunities that prosecutors have in advancing
social justice goals); Susan Segal, Downtown 100 Initiative, CHANGEMAKERS, https://www.
changemakers.com/node/168883 (last visited July 24, 2016) (describing a downtown Minneapolis
holistic prosecution program).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 11

HOFSTRA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 44:1207

leadership positions. A prosecutorial office should support such
should include funding and paid
activities, and the office's budget
84
release time for such activities.

No doubt, there are no clear standards that delineate the
prosecutorial minister of justice role. While the longstanding and

repeated quest for prosecutors' offices to develop clearer guidelines and
standards may continue to elude the criminal justice system,85 certain

courses of conduct-such as the aforementioned cases-may be viewed
as normatively outside the realm of reasonable discretionary decisionmaking and, consequently, outside the minister of justice role. In other
words, prosecutorial standards for the minister of justice role in case
management may be elusive, but in some cases, the result for the client
is so extreme that the judiciary should take the responsibility to impose

and ensure an implied standard of reasonable conduct for the prosecutor
as minister of justice.86 Such judicial action may inspire further
discussion about the need for enforceable standards.87
Defense lawyers should have an ethical obligation to act beyond the
proverbial "do the very best you can as a zealous advocate for your
client."88 Our system contemplates individual client-centered advocacy,
maximizing the autonomy and dignity of each individual.8 9 But, this
does not fully answer the question of what a lawyer should or must do
when a client's case is the consequence of episodic or systemic injustice.
Law review hand-wringing does not provide sufficient answers. Skirting

84. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEF. FUNCTION,
Standard 3-1.2 (4th ed. 2015).
85. See, e.g., Green & Zacharias, supra note 68, at 896-98 (explaining that in the absence of
standards and principles governing the exercise of discretion, chief prosecutors should develop and
implement their own principles and subprinciples to govern decision-making in their offices); Rory
K. Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Preceptfor Prosecutors in Their Investigative Role, 68
FORDHAM L. REv. 723, 751-60 (1999) (proposing an ethical standard that prosecutors engage in a
proportionality analysis to guide their exercise of investigative discretion along with a duty to seek
supervisory review and relevant training).
86. Some may claim that courts currently undertake such a role as a neutral evaluator of the
case. Courts, however, have not assumed the responsibility of evaluating the minister of justice
obligation of the prosecutor. Perhaps such an approach may induce a different result.
87. See, e.g., Green & Zacharias, supra note 68, at 845 (noting the importance of
"advanc[ing] the dialogue regarding appropriate principles ofprosecutorial decision-making"). This
ethical obligation is not envisioned as a rule that gives rise to discipline, but should be the subject of
standards and guidelines at this juncture.
88. Similar to the Prosecution Function,this ethical obligation is not currently envisioned as a
rule that gives rise to discipline but as an evolving standard to guide defense lawyer conduct. See
Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A Thought
Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors,89 B.U. L. REv. 1, 15 (2009).
89. Katherine R. Kruse, Engaged Client-CenteredRepresentationand the Moral Foundations
of the Lawyer-Client Relationship,39 HOFSTRA L. REv. 577, 578-79 (2011).
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contempt by the defense lawyer may be necessary in an individual case,
but it is unsatisfactory as a systemic response.90 The prosecution and the
court need to assume greater responsibility for unjust discretionary
decisions, and the defense lawyer should speak such truth to power.9 1
Defense lawyers should be obligated to target ways in which
specific prosecutorial conduct violates the minister of justice role, even
if the conduct falls short of a constitutional or statutory violation. Scott
should challenge the fact that requesting bail at all for Cy Lester--even
if the office policy for domestic violence cases is to request bail-is
unconscionable, unnecessary, unfair, and contrary to expectations of
conduct in civilized society. Scott, or any defense lawyer, summoning
evidence-based reports on the effects of bail should argue the reasons
why the prosecutor's recommendation is in derogation of his role as a
minister of justice. The prosecutor's discretionary decision has
significant destructive consequences including certainty that the
defendant will remain in jail at Rikers Island-notorious for danger to
inmates and for those with mental and physical health needs-where it is
known that he likely will not to get adequate care.92 If the prosecution is
unaware of these likely consequences, the defense lawyer must point to
the prosecutorial obligation to learn of such consequences. The defense
lawyer should challenge the prosecutor's failure to consider these
factors, request that the prosecution reply to each of these likely
consequences, and reconsider its bail recommendation. A similar
argument about consequences should be made to a court-reminding the
court of its role pursuant to Canon 1 of the ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct-to ensure the integrity of the criminal system, including the
consequences of its action. 93
90. There is a robust literature about "cause lawyering" both in individual cases and in
systemic challenges. Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of
Professional Authority: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING, POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 7 (1998). "Cause lawyering" refers to a continuum of challenges
including "working within professional understandings of skilled and zealous client
representation... to make the profession live up to its own avowed ideals and to somehow stretch
those ideals from the representation of individual litigants to causes." Id. It challenges the exercise
of executive and judicial power. See Richard Abel, Speaking Law to Power: Occasionsfor Cause
Lawyering, in CAUSE LAWYERING, POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

86-87 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998). Cause lawyering scholarship does not suggest
an ethical obligation of the defense lawyer to act to curb executive or judicial power. Id. at 86-87.
91. Alshuler, supranote 60, at 192-93.
92. See Dan Weiss, Privatization and Its Discontents: The Troubling Record of Privatized
Prison Health Care, 86 U. COLO. L. REv. 725, 770-72 (2015); Andrew P. Wilper et al., The Health
and Health Care of US Prisoners: Results of a Nationwide Survey, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 666,
666-71 (2009); see Prisoners' Rights: Medical and Mental Health Care, ACLU, https://www.
aclu.org/issues/prisoners-rights/medical-and-mental-health-care (last visited July 24, 2016).
93. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2010).
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The defense lawyer, of course, must speak truth to power in a
professional manner. Being outraged does not give license to act
outrageously. However, it does mean that the defense lawyer should
draw attention to the role of the prosecutor and the role of the court in
promoting an unjust system or unjust action toward the defendant.
The obligation to challenge truth to power should be part and parcel
of the defense lawyer's ethical obligation to provide competent
counsel.94 Competency should require knowledge of the consequences of
prosecutorial and judicial discretionary decision-making for the
individual client9 5 and the necessity to raise such issues with the court,
so long as they are not inconsistent with the duty to the client. Thus, in
cases where a lawyer determines that raising such issues will negatively
affect the client's case, the lawyer is not bound to speak truth to power
as envisioned by this Article.
It may reasonably be asked, why should defense lawyers have an
added ethical responsibility when it is the executive and judicial
branches that have acted outside of a reasonable person's view of
appropriate conduct? A simple answer is that it is essential to challenge
the exercise of prosecutorial and judicial action, and no other actor in the
system can adequately and zealously undertake that responsibility. It is
the role of the defense lawyer to uphold the client's constitutional rights
and to be liberty's last champion.96 Moreover, such an obligation can
serve as a sword and shield for the lawyer.97 The lawyer will now be
empowered to challenge unjust prosecutorial and judicial action. Those
lawyers who are reluctant to do so now for fear that a current challenge
to a prosecutor's action will reverberate negatively for that lawyer's
future clients can rely upon the fact that she has an ethical obligation to
propound such arguments. This may, of course, not be effective initially,
but over the course of time, a recognized obligation to speak truth to
power about prosecutorial decisions hopefully will be viewed as part of

94. This could be expressed as a comment to Rule 1.1 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct-the duty to provide competent counsel. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM.
BAR ASS'N 2013). That duty is currently expressed in terms of knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and
preparation. Id. It does not refer to challenges to the conduct of the prosecution or the court. Nor
does the ABA Defense Function address this issue. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTION AND DEF. FUNCTION, Standard 4-1.2 (4th ed. 2015).
95. Defense lawyers have increasing obligations to learn of consequences of criminal
convictions. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010); Paul Bennett Marrow, Limitations
on the Duty to Advise: Knowing When It's Time to Say More, Not Less, N.Y. ST. B.J. MarJApr.
2011, at 33, 34.
96. See Abbe Smith, The Difference in Criminal Defense and the Difference It Makes, 11
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 83, 87-88 (2003).

97. See id.
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the role of defense counsel, not as a personal or political attack on the
individual prosecutor.98
The obligation also functions as a shield when a court criticizes the
lawyer for speaking truth to power in challenging prosecutorial or
judicial conduct. The court may be inclined to threaten the defense
lawyer with contempt of court. In such case, the ethical obligation to
speak truth to power operates as a shield against contempt, and the
lawyer may remind the court that she is required to raise such issues.
There are other objections to imposing such an obligation. First,
many defense lawyers will claim that this is a relatively meaningless
obligation because it is precisely their current course of conduct; though,
they might not use the minister ofjustice terminology or the necessity of
the court to comply with the judicial conduct canons.99 Instead, the
lawyers say, they make all of the contemplated arguments and lose. Why
will this be any different? Perhaps, lawyers currently challenge the
prosecution and the court in this fashion--often with little result.
Perhaps, at least in the short term, speaking truth to power about the
prosecutor's dereliction of role will not result in any changed decisions.
However, the hope is that such obligation will result in a discourse over
time that will achieve some results. This truth to power obligation may
reverberate in the media and the public may develop greater awareness
of the robust role of the prosecutor as a minister of justice and the
court's obligation to ensure the integrity of the process. Judges, defense
lawyers, and prosecutors can privately and publicly discuss the
consequences of such an obligation and promote standards and
guidelines to provide context for such a concept. Bar committees can
consider the imposition of such an ethical obligation. In other words,
sustained focus upon such roles may have some impact. Over time,
prosecutors and courts may respond in productive ways to an ethically
based challenge to their discretionary decisions." At the very least, the
98. Ethical rules function as an accepted "sword" in a range of situations. For example,
prosecutors may be disturbed that a defense lawyer has vigorously cross examined a truthful witness
to make it appear as if the witness is presenting false testimony. In such context, the prosecution is
reminded of and typically accepts that it is the defense lawyer's ethical obligation to challenge the
prosecution's case. See, e.g., John Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts Are Where You Find Them: A
Response to Professor Subin 's Position on the Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission," 1 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHics 339, 344 (1987). Over time, prosecutors may come to accept the challenge that they
have not acted in accordance with their role as minister ofjustice, and for those prosecutors now so
inclined, will not take that challenge personally or have it reverberate against a defense lawyer's
future clients.
99. See, e.g., Lissa Griffin & Stacy Caplow, Changes to the Culture of Adversarialness:
Endorsing Candor, Cooperation,and Civility in Relationships Between Prosecutors and Defense
Counsel, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 845, 873 (2011).
100. Of course, the literature is replete with commentary about how prosecutors do not respond
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client will have an advocate that speaks truth to power. This can only
enhance the client's view that his lawyer is a zealous advocate who
combats unreasonable executive and judicial action.
Another question that could be posed: Should this duty extend to
prosecutors-that is, should prosecutors be charged with challenging
defense lawyers whose conduct is perceived to be beyond their
proper role? To the extent that prosecutors do not currently challenge
a defense lawyer whose conduct is beyond the limits of zealous
advocacy, the short answer is no. 10 1 The duties of prosecutors and
defense counsel are not wholly comparable.1"2 The executive branch
possesses the power of the state; the defense lawyer only has an
obligation to zealously represent an individual and afford the client the
effective assistance of counsel. 103
Others may question why the duty to speak truth to power should
not be raised in every case. Some lawyers will argue that the entire
system unfairly targets and prosecutes each of their clients, 10 4 thereby
requiring the lawyer to challenge the prosecutor as not acting in
accordance with its role as minister of justice in every case. A similar
contention may be made about nearly every judicial decision in some
courtrooms. In such a case, is this not a meaningless obligation? First,
those lawyers who raise this issue in every case do so in accordance with
their obligation to be a zealous advocate." 5 That is, if counsel's
judgment is that it is appropriate and advantageous for each client to
raise such a claim, then counsel should do so. However, it is unlikely to
be effective in all cases and may, in fact, undermine the individual
client's case if the lawyer makes such claims on a regular basis.
Credibility matters. The lawyer who invokes the duty of truth to power
well to challenges to their conduct. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Beyond TrainingProsecutorsAbout
Their Disclosure Obligations: Can Prosecutors' Offices Learnfrom Their Lawyers' Mistakes?, 31
CARDOZO L. REv. 2161, 2174, 2177-78 (2010).
101. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.3(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013) (stating that
attorneys have ethical obligations to report misconduct). Where a defense lawyer acts contrary to
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the prosecution will often raise the issue with a
court or disciplinary authority. Id.
102.

ABA

STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL

JUSTICE:

PROSECUTION

AND

DEF.

FUNCTION,

Standard 4-1.2 (4th ed. 2015).
103. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 2, r. 1.1, 1.3. The defense lawyer does
not have a comparable broad role as a minister of justice. The famous Lord Brougham statement in
1820 in Queen Caroline's case that "an advocate ... knows but one person in all the world and that
person is his client" serves as the fundamental principle for defense counsel. Monroe H. Freedman,
Idea, Henry Lord Brougham and Zeal, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1319, 1322 (2006) (quoting Trial of
Queen Caroline 2 (1821)). Limits of zealous advocacy are imposed upon the defense lawyer in such
representation. See id.
104. See Criminal Law Reform, supranote 22.
105. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 2.
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does so judiciously to advantage the client and to maximize that client's
10 6

dignity and autonomy.

Others may claim that any such duty to speak truth to power is a
duty upon the defense lawyer to advance the administration of justice.
Such a view imposes a duty upon the defense lawyer beyond her proper
role. The defense attorney has a duty only to the client and to act toward
the system within the limits of zealous advocacy as set forth in ethical
rules. 0 7 Rule 8.4(d) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which
sanctions an attorney who engages in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice, does not impose these additional duties upon
defense lawyers to promote the administration of justice.10 8 In other
words, Rule 8.4(d) is not the proper rule within which to locate the duty
to speak truth to power. Certainly, the intent of the obligation is to have
an impact upon the administration of justice, but fundamentally, this is
not an obligation of defense counsel.0 9
Finally, cultural change within the criminal justice system is
essential if the obligation to speak truth to power is to have any
cognizable effect.1" 0 Prosecutors' offices need to embrace the mantle of
the holistic prosecutor who acts as a minister of justice in its most
fundamental and profound sense. Executive power must be exercised
wisely, judiciously, and in accordance with constitutional rights and
community values. The minister of justice must develop a social justice
perspective that takes consequences of criminal adjudication into
account. Moreover, judges too must develop their role as the
independent check on executive power to ensure the integrity of our
106. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) ("[A] lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation and... shall consult with the client as to the
means by which they are to be pursued."); see Erica J. Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The
Criminal Defendant's Right to Control the Case, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1147, 1147-49 (2010); David
Luban, Lawyers as Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren't Busy Assaulting 1t), 2005 U.
ILL. L. REV. 815, 819-20 (2005).
107. See supra text accompanying note 1034.
108. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (providing that it is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to "engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration ofjustice").
109. See 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 29 (2015); see also Robert A. Stein, Causes of Popular
Dissatisfactionwith the Administration of Justice in the Twenty-First Century, 30 HAMLINE L. REV.
499, 503-04, 506-07 (2007).
110. Writings on organizations demonstrate the importance of system-wide attention to culture
if change is to become effective. See, e.g., Ellen Yaroshefsky & Bruce A. Green, Prosecutor's
Ethics in Context: Influences on ProsecutorialDisclosure, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE 289, 290
(Leslie A. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012); Hadar Aviram, Legally Blind: Hyperadversarialism,
Brady Violations, and the ProsecutorialOrganizationalCulture, 87 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 5 (2013);
Janet C. Hoeffel, ProsecutorialDiscretion at the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets Brady, 109
PENN. ST. L. REV. 1133, 1154 (2005); Kathleen M. Ridolfi, New Perspectives on Brady and Other
Disclosure Obligations: Report of the Working Groups on Best Practices, 31 CARDOZO L. REV.
1961,2031 (2010).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

19

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 11

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 44:1207

criminal justice system. A court is charged with being independent and
acting as a check upon the factual basis for a case as well as upon just
decision-making more generally."'
Unfortunately, this is a far cry from reality. The Spangenberg
Report, noted above, found that in criminal justice systems throughout
the country, "judicial oversight has become relatively meaningless,
particularly in misdemeanor cases where, on average, judges give no
more than three to five minutes of court time to any given case."' 12 Amy
Bach, who traveled the country studying misdemeanor systems, reached
the conclusion shared by other observers that the courts are comprised of
"legal professionals who have become so accustomed to a pattern of
lapses that they can no longer see their role in them.""' 3 This is
particularly true of the courts that do not provide a "meaningful check on
executive power by acting as a truly independent actor."' 14 At least part
of the burden is upon the criminal defense lawyer to point out to the
courts their unique and essential role to uphold the integrity of the
criminal justice system.
As Gary Bellow observed long ago, "[l]awyers influence and shape
the practices and institutions in which they work, if only to reinforce and
legitimate them.""' 5 If the criminal justice system is to provide a
glimmer of justice for the thousands of people brought before its courts
on a daily basis, the criminal defense lawyer deserves respect for
exercising the obligation to speak truth to power. Such an obligation
reinforces and legitimizes the proper roles of the prosecutor and the
court, and it may provide a small measure of hope that our aspirations
toward a just system will slowly be observed in practice.
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